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THE MAXIMUM-WEIGHT STABLE MATCHING PROBLEM:
DUALITY AND EFFICIENCY∗
XUJIN CHEN† , GUOLI DING‡ , XIAODONG HU† , AND WENAN ZANG§
Abstract. Given a preference system (G, ≺) and an integral weight function defined on the edge
set of G (not necessarily bipartite), the maximum-weight stable matching problem is to find a stable
matching of (G, ≺) with maximum total weight. In this paper we study this N P -hard problem using
linear programming and polyhedral approaches. We show that the Rothblum system for defining
the fractional stable matching polytope of (G, ≺) is totally dual integral if and only if this polytope
is integral if and only if (G, ≺) has a bipartite representation. We also present a combinatorial
polynomial-time algorithm for the maximum-weight stable matching problem and its dual on any
preference system with a bipartite representation. Our results generalize Király and Pap’s theorem
on the maximum-weight stable-marriage problem and rely heavily on their work.
Key words.
stable matching, linear system, integral polytope, total dual integrality,
polynomial-time algorithm
AMS subject classifications. 90C10, 90C27, 90C57
DOI. 10.1137/120864866

1. Introduction. Let G = (V, E) be a graph. For each v ∈ V , let δ(v) be the
set of all edges incident with v and let ≺v be a strict linear order on δ(v). We call ≺v
the preference of v and say that v prefers e to f if e ≺v f . Let ≺ be the collection
of all these ≺v for v ∈ V . We call the pair (G, ≺) a preference system. In particular,
(G, ≺) is referred to as a bipartite preference system if G is a bipartite graph. For
convenience, we write e v f and say that e dominates f at vertex v if e ≺v f or
e = f . An edge e is said to dominate an edge f if they have a common end v such that
e v f . Let M be a matching of G. We call M stable if each edge of G is dominated by
some edge in M . The stable matching problem (SMP) is to determine if G contains a
stable matching. The origin of this problem can be traced back to 1962 when Gale and
Shapley [4] proposed the well-known stable marriage problem (which corresponds to
the case where G is a bipartite graph); since then the SMP and its variants have been
subjects of extensive research; see, for instance, the books by Knuth [9], Gusﬁeld and
Irving [6], Roth and Sotomayor [10], and the references therein. Gale and Shapley [4]
proved that for the stable marriage problem a stable matching always exists. Irving
[7] devised the ﬁrst polynomial-time algorithm for ﬁnding a stable matching of (G, ≺),
if any, or declaring that no such matching exists, where G is not necessarily bipartite.
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With an attempt to improve Irving’s algorithm [7], Tan [14] obtained a necessary
and suﬃcient condition for the existence of a (perfect) stable matching in terms of
forbidden structures, the so-called stable partitions with odd parties.
The present paper is devoted to the maximum-weight stable matching problem
(MWSMP), which takes a preference system (G, ≺) and an integral weight function
w deﬁned on E as input, and aims to ﬁnd a stable matching of (G, ≺) with maximum
total weight as output, where G = (V, E). As shown by Feder [3], this problem is N P hard in general, so there is no polynomial-time algorithm for solving it exactly unless
N P = P . In this paper we study the MWSMP using linear programming and polyhedral approaches, which were ﬁrst applied to stable matchings by Vande Vate [16]
and Rothblum [12]. It was discovered by Rothblum [12] that the convex hull of stable
matchings of a bipartite preference system can be described by a very simple system
of linear inequalities; this polyhedral description was later extended and further developed in diﬀerent aspects by Roth, Rothblum, and Vande Vate [11], Abeledo and
Rothblum [1], Teo and Sethuraman [15], and Király and Pap [8]. The objective of this
paper is to characterize all preference systems for which the above-mentioned Rothblum system is totally dual integral (TDI) and to present a combinatorial polynomialtime algorithm for the MWSMP and its dual on these preference systems.
We introduce some notation and terminology before proceeding. As usual, let R
(resp., R+ ) be the set of all (resp., nonnegative) real numbers, and let Z (resp., Z+ )
be the set of all (resp., nonnegative) integers. A subset P of Rn is called a polytope if
it is the convex hull of ﬁnitely many vectors in Rn . A point x in P is called a vertex or
an extreme point if there exist no distinct points y and z in P and α ∈ (0, 1) such that
x = αy + (1 − α)z. It is well known that P is actually the convex hull of its vertices
and that there exists a linear system Ax ≤ b such that P = {x : Ax ≤ b}. We call
P integral if each of its vertices is an integral vector. By a theorem in mathematical
programming, P is integral if and only if the maximum in the linear programming
duality equation
(1.1)

max{wT x : Ax ≤ b} = min{y T b : y T A = wT, y ≥ 0}

has an integral optimal solution for every integral vector w for which the optimum is
ﬁnite. If, instead, the minimum in the equation enjoys this property, then the system
Ax ≤ b is called totally dual integral (TDI). The model of TDI systems plays a crucial
role in combinatorial optimization and serves as a general framework for establishing
various min-max theorems because, as shown by Edmonds and Giles [2], total dual
integrality implies primal integrality: if Ax ≤ b is TDI and b is integral, then P is
integral.
Let (G, ≺) be a preference system, where G = (V, E). For each e ∈ E, let ϕ(e)
denote the set of all edges of G that dominate e, and let ψ(e) denote the 
set of all edges
of G that are dominated by e. For each c ∈ RE and S ⊆ E, let c(S) = s∈S c(s). As
observed by Abeledo and Rothblum [1], the incidence vectors of stable matchings of
(G, ≺) are precisely integral solutions x ∈ ZE of the following inequalities:
(1.2)

x(δ(v)) ≤ 1

∀ v ∈ V,

(1.3)

x(ϕ(e)) ≥ 1

∀ e ∈ E,

(1.4)

x(e) ≥ 0

∀ e ∈ E.

Let SM (G, ≺) denote the convex hull of incidence vectors of all stable matchings of
(G, ≺), and let F SM (G, ≺) denote the set of all vectors x ∈ RE satisfying (1.2)−(1.4).
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Clearly, SM (G, ≺) ⊆ F SM (G, ≺). In the literature, SM (G, ≺) and F SM (G, ≺) are
called the stable matching polytope and fractional stable matching polytope of (G, ≺),
respectively.
For each x ∈ F SM (G, ≺), set
• E+ (x) = {e ∈ E : xe > 0},
• Eα (x) = {e ∈ E : xe = α} for any α ∈ R, and
• T (x) = {uv ∈ E : ∃ e, f ∈ E+ (x) such that uv u e and uv v f }.
Notice that T (x) consists of every edge uv of G that dominates some edges in E+ (x)
at both u and v. Let GT (x) denote the subgraph of G induced by all edges in T (x). As
we shall see, GT (x) can be used to characterize all vertices x of F SM (G, ≺). A cycle
C = v1 v2 . . . vk v1 of G is said to have a cyclic preference in (G, ≺) if vi−1 vi vi vi vi+1
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k or vi+1 vi vi vi vi−1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, where vk+1 = v1 . Moreover, a
vector y is called half-integral if all coordinates of 2y are integral.
Let π(G, ≺) stand for the system of linear inequalities (1.2)−(1.4). Rothblum [12]
proved that the stable matching polytope of a bipartite preference system (G, ≺) is
completely determined by π(G, ≺).
Theorem 1.1 (Rothblum [12]). Let (G, ≺) be a bipartite preference system.
Then
SM (G, ≺) = F SM (G, ≺).
For an arbitrary preference system, Abeledo and Rothblum [1] showed that the
vertices of its fractional stable matching polytope are always half-integral; they also
gave a description of all vertices of this polytope.
Theorem 1.2 (Abeledo–Rothblum [1]). Let (G, ≺) be a preference system and
let x be a point in F SM (G, ≺). Then x is a vertex of F SM (G, ≺) if and only if
(i) x is half-integral and
(ii) each component of GT (x) having edges in E1/2 (x) contains at least one odd
cycle.
In [8], Király and Pap obtained the following strengthening of Theorem 1.1.
Theorem 1.3 (Király–Pap [8]). Let (G, ≺) be a bipartite preference system.
Then π(G, ≺) is TDI.
Let (G, ≺) be a preference system with G = (V, E). Recall that for each v ∈ V ,
its preference ≺v is a strict linear order on δ(v). Let N (v) be the neighborhood of v.
With a slight abuse of notation, we also view ≺v as a strict linear order on N (v), such
that a ≺v b (that is, v prefers a to b) if and only if va ≺v vb. Thus we can naturally
associate a preference list with v, which lists its neighbors in the increasing order of
≺v . Note that this list is empty if N (v) = ∅. The preference table of (G, ≺) consists of
the preference lists of all vertices of G and is denoted by T (G, ≺) or simply by T (G)
when ≺ is clear from the context. We use fG (v) or fT (G) (v) (resp., lG (v) or lT (G) (v))
to denote the ﬁrst (resp., last) vertex on v’s preference list. A pair of vertices {u, v} is
said to belong to T (G) if uv ∈ E. By deleting a pair {u, v} from T (G) we mean the operation of deleting u from v’s preference list and deleting v from u’s preference list. For
each subgraph K of G, let ≺K be the projection of ≺ onto K. Clearly, (K, ≺K ) is also
a preference system. For notational simplicity, we write (K, ≺) for (K, ≺K ) hereafter.
In [7], Irving devised a two-phase polynomial-time algorithm for ﬁnding a stable
matching of (G, ≺), if any, or declaring that no such matching exists. It is worthwhile
pointing out that Irving’s original algorithm was intended for the so-called stable
roommates problem, but it can be extended to the general SMP with only a slight
modiﬁcation (see subsection 4.5.2 of Gusﬁeld and Irving [6]). Now let us present Phase
1 of his algorithm, which is actually a proposal sequence and will play an important
role in our proofs.
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Phase 1 of Irving’s algorithm (Phase I) description: Initially, the preference table T is set to T (G, ≺), and every vertex is set free. Each successive proposal
in this phase is made by some free vertex v with nonempty preference list in T to
fT (v), who receives the proposal. As a result of this proposal, v ceases to be free
and becomes semiengaged to fT (v) and fT (v) rejects any vertex who was previously
semiengaged to it; the rejected vertex (if any) is reset free. Moreover, T is updated
by deleting all pairs {fT (v), u} in T with v ≺fT (v) u. The phase continues as long as
some free vertex has a nonempty preference list (and can therefore make a further
proposal).
To facilitate better understanding of this phase, we ﬁrst remark that the semiengagement, as its name implies, is not symmetric. At the point when v becomes
semiengaged to fT (v), this fT (v) may be free or may be semiengaged to someone
else; second, there are no “immediate rejections” in the algorithm; such rejections are
preempted by the deletion of pairs from the preference table. To be precise, when
v becomes semiengaged to fT (v), all pairs {fT (v), v  } in that table such that fT (v)
prefers v to v  are deleted, so that v becomes the last entry on fT (v)’s list and fT (v)
becomes the ﬁrst on v’s list. If some other u was previously semiengaged to fT (v),
then it can be shown that this semiengagement is broken, the pair {fT (v), u} is among
those deleted, and u is set free as a result (see p. 167 of Gusﬁeld and Irving [6]).
The preference table produced by Phase I will be referred to as the phase-1
table. Although some nondeterminism is involved in Phase I, the following statement
(Lemma 4.2.1 in Gusﬁeld and Irving [6]) asserts that it is of no consequence.
Lemma 1.4. For any given preference system, all possible executions of Phase I
yield the same phase-1 table.
Let H be a spanning subgraph of G. We call (H, ≺) the representation of (G, ≺)
if the preference table T (H, ≺) is precisely the phase-1 table of (G, ≺).
Throughout this paper, let P(G, ≺, w) stand for the LP relaxation of the MWSMP
(1.5)

Maximize

wT x

subject to

x ∈ F SM (G, ≺)

and let D(G, ≺, w) stand for its dual
(1.6)
(1.7)
(1.8)

Minimize

y(V ) − z(E)

subject to

y(u) + y(v) − z(ψ(uv)) ≥ w(uv)
y(v) ≥ 0

∀ uv ∈ E,
∀ v ∈ V,

z(e) ≥ 0

∀ e ∈ E.

Moreover, we propose to call an integral feasible solution (y, z) of D(G, ≺, w) a stable
cover,1 whose cost is deﬁned to be y(V ) − z(E).
Given C = {C1 , C2 , . . . , Ck } such that
• each Ci is a vertex of G or an edge of G or a cycle with cyclic preference in
(G, ≺),
• each vertex of G is contained in some Ci , and
• C1 , C2 , . . . , Ck are pairwise vertex-disjoint,
we deﬁne xC ∈ RE as
⎧
if e ∈ C,
⎨1
(1.9)
xC (e) = 1/2 if e is contained in some cycle in C,
⎩
0
otherwise
1 This

concept is in some sense very similar to w-stable set defined by Schrijver [13].
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for all e ∈ E and call C a semistable partition of (G, ≺) if xC ∈ F SM (G, ≺). The
partition is so named because, as stated before, Tan [14] characterized all preference
systems with (perfect) stable matchings in terms of forbidden structures, the so-called
stable partitions with odd parties. (To be speciﬁc, C is called a stable partition of
(G, ≺) if for any e ∈ E with xC (e) = 0, at least one end v of e satisﬁes xC (ϕ(e) ∩
δ(v)) ≥ 1, and a member Ci of C is called an odd party if Ci has an odd cardinality.)
Obviously, every stable partition is a semistable partition, but the converse need
not hold. The other motivation for semistable partitions is given as follows: by
Theorem 3.4 in Abeledo and Rothblum [1], if x is a half-integral point in F SM (G, ≺),
then the set of edges in E1/2 (x) forms vertex-disjoint cycles in G, each having cyclic
preferences. Combining this observation with Theorem 1.2(i), we see that every vertex
of F SM (G, ≺) naturally corresponds to a semistable partition of (G, ≺). Therefore,
to ensure the integrality of F SM (G, ≺), we may turn to eliminating certain types of
semistable partitions of (G, ≺).
Set E(C) = ∪ki=1 E(Ci ) and
EC = {uv ∈ E : ∃ e1 , e2 , f1 , f2 ∈ E(C) such that
(1.10)

e1 u uv u e2 and f1 v uv v f2 }.

Let GC be the subgraph of G induced by all edges in EC . Now we are ready to
present the main result of this paper, which contains a complete characterization of
all preference systems (G, ≺) with TDI π(G, ≺).
Theorem 1.5. Let (G, ≺) be a preference system with G = (V, E), and let (H, ≺)
be its representation. Then the following statements are equivalent:
(i) H is a bipartite graph;
(ii) GC is bipartite for every semistable partition C of (G, ≺);
(iii) SM (G, ≺) = F SM (G, ≺); and
(iv) π(G, ≺) is TDI.
Moreover, for any G as described in (i) and any w ∈ ZE , a maximum-weight stable
matching and a minimum-cost stable cover of (G, ≺, w) can be found in O(m2 log m)
time, where m = |E|.
Five remarks may help to put our theorem in proper perspective: First, Theorem 1.5 clearly generalizes the above Király–Pap theorem. Second, Theorem 1.2
contains a complete characterization of all preference systems (G, ≺) whose fractional
stable matching polytope is integral, that is, SM (G, ≺) = F SM (G, ≺). The equivalence of (ii) and (iii) in our theorem also serves this purpose, but the bipartition
requirement in our structural description is diﬀerent from the negation of (ii) in Theorem 1.2. Third, from the deﬁnition of TDI system and the aforementioned Edmonds–
Giles theorem [2], we see that if π(G, ≺) is TDI, then both D(G, ≺, w) and P(G, ≺, w)
have integral optimal solutions for any w ∈ ZE . Thereby we get a structural characterization of the following min-max relation on stable matchings.
Corollary 1.6. Let (G, ≺) be a preference system with G = (V, E), and let
(H, ≺) be its representation. Then the maximum total weight of a stable matching of
(G, ≺) is equal to the minimum cost of a stable cover of (G, ≺) for every w ∈ ZE if
and only if GC is bipartite for every semistable partition C of (G, ≺) if and only if H
is bipartite.
We point out that this min-max relation closely resembles Kőnig’s min-max theorem on bipartite matching and the min-max theorem on weighted bipartite edge
covers; see Theorems 16.2 and 19.5 in Schrijver [13]. Fourth, in Tan’s characterization [14] of all preference systems with stable matchings, the forbidden structures are
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stable partitions with odd parties, while the obstructions to our min-max relation are
semistable partitions with odd cycles. So these two characterizations are essentially
in the same spirit. (Since any integral optimal solution to the MWSMP is a solution
to the corresponding SMP, and since the MWSMP is N P -hard while the SMP is solvable in polynomial time, presumably more graphical structures should be excluded in
our study than in Tan’s characterization.) Finally, since (H, ≺) can be produced by
Phase I in O(m) time, Theorem 1.5 yields a linear-time algorithm for recognizing
the scenarios addressed in (ii)−(iv) by testing if H is a bipartite graph.
A linear system Ax ≤ b is called totally dual half-integral (TDI/2) if the minimum
in the LP-duality equation (1.1) has a half-integral optimal solution for every integral
vector w for which the optimum is ﬁnite. It is easy to verify that Ax ≤ b is TDI/2
if and only if Bx ≤ b is TDI, where B = A/2. Thus, from the above Edmonds–Giles
theorem [2], we deduce that if Ax ≤ b is TDI/2 and b is integral, then the maximum
in (1.1) also has a half-integral optimal solution for every integral vector w for which
the optimum is ﬁnite. Recall from Theorem 1.2 that for any preference system, all
vertices of the fractional stable matching polytope are half-integral. Clearly, our next
theorem strengthens this result.
Theorem 1.7. Let (G, ≺) be a preference system with G = (V, E). Then π (G, ≺)
is TDI/2. Moreover, for any w ∈ ZE , a half-integral optimal solution to P(G, ≺, w)
and a half-integral optimal solution to D(G, ≺, w) can be found in O(m2 log m) time,
where m = |E|.
2. Preliminaries. In our proofs, we shall use the following charming property
enjoyed by stable matchings, which was ﬁrst exhibited by Abeledo and Rothblum [1]
(see Theorem 4.2).
Theorem 2.1 (Abeledo–Rothblum [1]). For any preference system (G, ≺), the
vertex set of G can be partitioned into V 0 and V 1 such that for every x ∈ F SM (G, ≺),
there holds x(δ(v)) = i for all v ∈ V i and i = 0, 1. (So all vertices in V 1 are matched
in every stable matching of (G, ≺) and no vertex in V 0 is matched in any stable
matching.)
Now let us exhibit some properties enjoyed by the representation of a preference
system. As usual, we use V (K) and E(K) to denote the vertex set and edge set of a
graph K, respectively.
Lemma 2.2. Let (G, ≺) be a preference system with G = (V, E), let (H, ≺) be
its representation, and let V 1 be the set of all nonisolated vertices of H. Then the
following statements hold:
(i) (G, ≺) and (H, ≺) have the same set of stable matchings. Besides, V 1 consists
of exactly the matched vertices in every stable matching (if any) of (G, ≺) and
(H, ≺).
(ii) For any distinct u, v ∈ V , u = fH (v) if and only if v = lH (u).
(iii) An edge uv ∈ E − E(H) if and only if u ∈ V 1 prefers lH (u) to v or v ∈ V 1
prefers lH (v) to u.
(iv) For each v ∈ V 1 , if fH (v) = lH (v), then fH (fH (v)) = v.
(v) For each v ∈ V 1 , let Gv be the graph obtained from G by deleting the edge
vlG (v). If H ⊆ Gv , then (H, ≺) is also the representation of (Gv , ≺).
Proof. The ﬁrst three statements can all be found in Gusﬁeld and Irving [6]: the
ﬁrst half of (i) is exactly the same as Lemma 4.2.3(i), the second half of (i) is contained
in Theorem 4.5.2, and statements (ii) and (iii) are the subjects of Lemma 4.2.2.
To justify (iv), observe from Phase I that every vertex u ∈ V 1 has to propose
to fH (u) at some step and remains semiengaged to fH (u) from that step onwards,
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otherwise the pair {u, fH (u)} would get deleted in the algorithm at some other step
and hence ufH (u) would not be an edge of H, a contradiction. Assume on the contrary
that fH (fH (v)) = v while fH (v) = lH (v) for some v ∈ V 1 . Then right after fH (v)
proposed to v, the pair {v, lH (v)} would get deleted in Phase I because by hypothesis
fH (v) ≺v lH (v), contradicting the fact that vlH (v) ∈ E(H). So (iv) is established.
To prove (v), note that since vlG (v) is not an edge of H and since v ∈ V 1 , we
have vfH (v) ≺v vlG (v). Thus v has never proposed to lG (v) in Phase I.
Claim. There exists an execution of Phase I in which lG (v) has never proposed
to v.
Assume the contrary: lG (v) has to propose to v in all possible executions of
Phase I. Let us consider an execution, denoted by (α), where the step at which lG (v)
proposes to v is as late as possible. Observe that after lG (v) proposed to v, nothing
was done except for the semiengagement of lG (v) to v. Moreover, no more proposal
was possible. (Otherwise, let k be the index such that the kth proposal in (α) is the
one made by lG (v) to v, and let (β) be an execution whose ﬁrst k − 1 proposals are
exactly the same as those of (α), while the kth proposal is the (k + 1)st proposal of
(α). Then we can see that either lG (v) has never proposed to v in (β) or the step at
which lG (v) proposes to v in (β) is later than that in (α), so we reach a contradiction
in either case.) Thus execution (α) terminates right after the proposal made by lG (v)
to v. It follows that (α) yields a phase-1 table which contains {v, lG (v)} as a pair,
contradicting Lemma 1.4 because vlG (v) is not an edge of H. Thus the claim is
justiﬁed.
Let (γ) be an execution of Phase I as claimed above. Since v and lG (v) have
never proposed to each other in (γ) and since (γ) terminates with T (H, ≺) as the
phase-1 table, (γ) naturally corresponds to an execution of Phase I on Gv which
terminates with T (H, ≺) as the phase-1 table as well. It follows that (H, ≺) is also
the representation of (Gv , ≺). Hence (v) holds.
In view of Lemma 2.2(ii), we introduce the following notation:
(2.1)

F (H) = {vfH (v) : v ∈ V 1 } = {vlH (v) : v ∈ V 1 }.

Let Ĥ be the subgraph of H induced by all edges in F (H). Thus Ĥ = (V 1 , F (H)).
Throughout we use  to denote the collection of all preference systems (G, ≺) such
that GC is bipartite for every semistable partition C of (G, ≺). (Recall the deﬁnition
above Theorem 1.5.)
Lemma 2.3. Let G, H, and V 1 be as given in Lemma 2.2, let F (H) and Ĥ be
as defined above, and let V 0 = V − V 1 . Then the following statements hold:
(i) Ĥ is the disjoint union of some edges and cycles, such that each of these
cycles has a cyclic preference in (G, ≺).
(ii) Let D be the set of all edges and cycles as specified in (i). Then each edge in
E(H) − F (H) (if any) has both ends on cycles in D.
(iii) Let C be obtained from D by adding all vertices in V 0 as elements. Then C
is a semistable partition of (G, ≺).
(iv) H\V 0 = GC , which implies that H is a bipartite graph if (G, ≺) ∈ .
Proof. To justify (i), note that by Lemma 2.2(ii), the maximum degree of Ĥ is at
most two and every cycle in Ĥ has a cyclic preference in (G, ≺). If the assertion fails,
then Ĥ would contain a longest induced path P = v1 v2 v3 . . . vk with k ≥ 3. Lemma
2.2(ii) allows us to assume that fH (vi ) = vi−1 and lH (vi ) = vi+1 for i = 2, 3, . . . , k − 1.
Thus fH (v2 ) = v1 = v3 = lH (v2 ). By Lemma 2.2(iv) (with v2 in place of v), we have
v2 = fH (fH (v2 )) = fH (v1 ). Since v1 fH (v1 ) is contained in F (H), it is an edge of Ĥ.

Copyright © by SIAM. Unauthorized reproduction of this article is prohibited.

Downloaded 05/12/14 to 147.8.204.164. Redistribution subject to SIAM license or copyright; see http://www.siam.org/journals/ojsa.php

THE MAXIMUM-WEIGHT STABLE MATCHING PROBLEM

1353

Hence the degree of v1 in Ĥ is precisely two, contradicting the assumption that P is
a longest induced path in Ĥ. So (i) holds.
To justify (ii), let uv ∈ E(H) − F (H). From (2.1), we deduce that ufH (u) ≺u
uv ≺u ulH (u) and vfH (v) ≺v uv ≺v vlH (v). Thus fH (u) = lH (u) and fH (v) = lH (v).
By deﬁnition, both u and v have degree two in Ĥ. Hence (ii) follows instantly from (i).
To justify (iii), recall (1.9) and (i). Clearly x = xC satisﬁes (1.2) and (1.4).
It remains to show that x satisﬁes (1.3), that is, x(ϕ(e)) ≥ 1 for any e ∈ E. To
this end, let e = uv. For e ∈ F (H), by (2.1) we may assume that v ∈ V 1 and
u = lH (v). Since vfH (v) v vlH (v) = e, we have x(ϕ(e)) ≥ x(e) = 1 if e ∈ C and
x(ϕ(e)) ≥ x(e) + x(vfH (v)) = 1/2 + 1/2 = 1 otherwise. For e ∈ E(H) − F (H),
it follows from (ii) that x(ϕ(e)) ≥ x(ufH (u)) + x(vfH (v)) = 1/2 + 1/2 = 1. For
e ∈ E − E(H), by Lemma 2.2(iii) there exists t ∈ V 1 ∩ {u, v} such that tlH (t) ≺t e,
yielding x(ϕ(e)) ≥ x(δ(t) ∩ F (H)) = 1. So x satisﬁes (1.3) as well. By deﬁnition, C is
a semistable partition of (G, ≺). This proves (iii).
To justify (iv), we appeal to Lemma 2.2(iii): an edge uv of G is contained in H
if and only if ufH (u) u uv u ulH (u) and vfH (v) v uv v vlH (v). In view of (i),
(iii), and (1.10), we obtain E(H) = EC . So (iv) is established.
Our next lemma implies that V i for i = 0, 1 involved in Lemma 2.3 is precisely
the same as that in Theorem 2.1.
Lemma 2.4. Let G, H, V 0 , and V 1 be as specified in the above two lemmas.
Then for every x ∈ F SM (G, ≺), the following statements hold:
(i) x(δ(v)) = i for every v ∈ V i and i = 0, 1 and
(ii) x(E − E(H)) = 0, which implies that x|E(H) ∈ F SM (H, ≺).
Proof. Let C be the semistable partition of (G, ≺) as speciﬁed in Lemma 2.3(iii).
Since xC ∈ F SM (G, ≺), from (1.9) we deduce that xC (δ(v)) = i for i = 0, 1 if and
only if v ∈ V i . Thus (i) follows from Theorem 2.1.
Assume on the contrary that x(uv) > 0 for some x ∈ F SM (G, ≺) and uv ∈
E − E(H); subject to this, we further assume that no pair {r, s} with x(rs) > 0
had been deleted in Phase I before {u, v}. Renaming u and v if necessary, we may
suppose {u, v} was deleted from the preference table T because u received a proposal
from vertex t. From Phase I we see that ut ≺u uv. In view of the choice of uv,
no edge in δ(t) ∩ {e ∈ E : x(e) > 0} had been deleted at the step when t proposed
to u. So ut dominates all edges in δ(t) ∩ {e ∈ E : x(e) > 0} in (G, ≺). It follows
that x(ϕ(ut)) ≤ x(δ(u)) − x(uv). By (1.2), we have x(δ(u)) ≤ 1, which implies
x(ϕ(ut)) ≤ 1 − x(uv) < 1, contradicting (1.3) for x ∈ F SM (G, ≺). Thus (ii) also
holds.
We shall establish the main result of this paper by an induction method; the
following statement will be used to dictate the induction step.
Lemma 2.5. Let (G, ≺) be a preference system with G = (V, E), and let (H, ≺)
be its representation with E − E(H) = ∅. Then G has three distinct vertices r, s, t,
such that fG (r) = s ∈ V 1 , lG (s) = t, and st ∈ E − E(H).
Proof. Set F = {vfG (v) : v ∈ V and N (v) = ∅}. If F ⊆ E(H), then Phase I
consists of |F | proposals resulting in no rejections and terminates with F (H) = F . By
Lemma 2.2(iii), there exists an edge su ∈ E−E(H) such that s ∈ V 1 and slH (s) ≺s su.
Set r = lH (s) and t = lG (s). Then sr ≺s su s st. From the deﬁnition of lH (s),
we see that st ∈ E − E(H). By Lemma 2.2(ii), s = fH (r). As F ⊆ E(H), we have
s = fG (r). Thus r, s, t are as desired, and hence we may assume that F − E(H) = ∅.
Set J = {v ∈ V : vfG (v) ∈ F − E(H)}. Let us consider an execution of Phase I
in which every free vertex v in J has the priority to propose to fG (v) who is still on v’s
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preference list (breaking ties arbitrarily). Then, under the assumption F − E(H) = ∅,
some vertex in J would certainly be rejected by its most preferred neighbor in G at
some step. Suppose the earliest rejection happened when a vertex v ∈ J was rejected
by s = fG (v) upon receiving a proposal from some r ∈ V − {v}. Since no vertex
in J had been rejected before, no pair which corresponds to an edge in F had been
deleted, and hence the proposal made by r was to s = fG (r), which implies that
fG (r) = fG (v) and {rs, vs} ⊆ δ(s) ∩ F . Since s rejected v due to the proposal made
by r, we obtain sr ≺s sv s slG (s). From the description of Phase I, it can be seen
that if a vertex receives a proposal in an execution, then it belongs to V 1 . Hence
s ∈ V 1 . Set t = lG (s). Clearly r, s, t are as desired.
3. Proofs of theorems. We break the proof of Theorem 1.5 into a series of
lemmas.
Lemma 3.1. Let (G, ≺) be a preference system. If F SM (G, ≺) = SM (G, ≺),
then (G, ≺) ∈ .
Proof. Let C be a semistable partition of (G, ≺). We aim to prove that GC is a
bipartite graph. Since xC ∈ F SM (G, ≺) (see (1.9)), by hypothesis we further have
xC ∈ SM (G, ≺). Therefore there exist stable matchings M (i) of (G, ≺), i = 1, 2, . . . , k,
such that xC is a convex combination of the incidence vectors x(i) of M (i) . It follows
that ∪ki=1 M (i) = E(C). In view of Theorem 2.1, the vertex subsets of G matched by
all M (i) are the same, so each M (i) is a perfect matching of K, the subgraph of G
induced by all edges in E(C), which in turn implies that all cycles in C are even. From
(1.10), it can be seen that
(3.1)

E(K) = E(C) = {vfGC (v) : v ∈ V (K)} = {vlGC (v) : v ∈ V (K)}.

Let W1 be the independent set in K such that M (1) = {vfGC (v) : v ∈ W1 } and let
W2 = V (K) − W1 . As xC ∈ F SM (G, ≺), we deduce that 2xC − x(1) is the incidence
vector of the stable matching {vfGC (v) : v ∈ W2 } of (G, ≺). So we may assume that
M (2) = {vfGC (v) : v ∈ W2 } and xC = 12 (x(1) + x(2) ). If some edge uv ∈ EC has both
ends in Wi for i = 1 or 2, then by (3.1) the edges in M (3−i) incident with u and v
are ulGC (u) and vlGC (v), respectively, neither dominating uv, which contradicts the
stability of M (3−i) . Thus each edge in GC has one end in W1 and the other in W2 ,
and hence GC is a bipartite graph, as desired.
Lemma 3.2. Let (G, ≺) be a preference system with a bipartite representation
(H, ≺) (that is, H is bipartite). Then π(G, ≺) is TDI.
We present two proofs of this lemma; the ﬁrst one, discovered by Tamás Király, is
shorter but does not yield a polynomial-time algorithm for the minimum-cost stable
cover problem, while the second is the backbone of the subsequent Algorithm 1.
Király’s proof is based on the following technical lemma.
Lemma 3.3. Let
(3.2)

Ax + B x̄ ≤ b, x ≥ 0, x̄ ≥ 0

and
(3.3)

Ax ≤ b, x ≥ 0

be two linear systems. Suppose x̄ ≡ 0 for all feasible solutions of (3.2). If (3.3) is
TDI, then so is (3.2).
Proof. Let w (resp., w̄) be an arbitrary integral vector with the same length as
x (resp., x̄). By hypothesis, (3.3) is a TDI system, so the linear program min{y T b :
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y T A ≥ wT , y ≥ 0} has an integral optimal solution y ∗ . Let c be the vector obtained
from w̄ − B T y ∗ by replacing each negative entry with 0. Then c ≥ w̄ − B T y ∗ . As the
optimal value of the linear program
max{0T x + cT x̄ : x and x̄ satisfy (3.2)}
is zero, its dual has an optimal solution ȳ satisfying ȳ T A ≥ 0, ȳ T B ≥ cT , ȳ ≥ 0, and
ȳ T b = 0. This zero optimal value and the fact c ≥ 0 allow us to assume that ȳ is
integral. (Otherwise replace ȳ with kȳ for some positive integer k.) Set ȳ ∗ = y ∗ + ȳ.
Clearly, ȳ ∗ is integral and satisﬁes
(3.4)

(ȳ ∗ )T A ≥ (y ∗ )T A ≥ wT , (ȳ ∗ )T B ≥ (y ∗ )T B + cT ≥ w̄T , ȳ ∗ ≥ 0,
and (ȳ ∗ )T b = (y ∗ )T b.

Since x̄ ≡ 0 for all feasible solutions of (3.2), and y ∗ is the optimal solution to the
dual of max{wT x : x satisﬁes (3.3)}, we deduce that
max{wT x + w̄T x̄ : x and x̄ satisfy (3.2)} = max{wT x : x satisﬁes (3.3)} = (y ∗ )T b,
which together with (3.4) implies that ȳ ∗ is an integral optimal solution to the dual
of max{wT x + w̄T x̄ : x and x̄ satisfy (3.2)}, and hence (3.2) is a TDI system.
Király’s proof of Lemma 3.2. Let G = (V, E). Write π(G, ≺) as Ax|E(H) +
Bx|E−E(H) ≤ b, x|E(H) ≥ 0, x|E−E(H) ≥ 0, where the columns of A and B are
indexed by edges in E(H) and in E − E(H), respectively, and b|V = 1, b|E = −1. By
Lemma 2.4(ii), we have
(3.5)

x|E−E(H) ≡ 0 for every feasible solution x ∈ RE to
Ax|E(H) + Bx|E−E(H) ≤ b, x|E(H) ≥ 0, x|E−E(H) ≥ 0.

Let w be an arbitrary vector in ZE(H) , let L = V ∪ E(H), and let C be the
submatrix of A formed by rows corresponding to elements in L. With a slight abuse
of the notation, put x = x|E(H) . Applying Theorem 1.3 to the bipartite preference
system (H, ≺), we see that Cx ≤ b|L , x ≥ 0 is a TDI system. So max{wT x : Cx ≤
b|L , x ≥ 0} and its dual have integral optimal solutions x∗ and y ∗ , respectively. By
Lemma 2.2(i), x∗ satisﬁes Ax ≤ b, x ≥ 0, which implies
(3.6)

max{wT x : Ax ≤ b, x ≥ 0} = max{wT x : Cx ≤ b|L , x ≥ 0}.

V ∪E
by adding zero entries, we obtain y T A = (y ∗ )T C ≥
Extending y ∗ ∈ ZL
+ to y ∈ Z+
T
T
∗ T
w , y ≥ 0, and y b = (y ) b|L = max{wT x : Cx ≤ b|L , x ≥ 0}. From (3.6), we
conclude that y is an integral optimal solution to the dual of max{wT x : Ax ≤ b, x ≥
0}. Hence Ax ≤ b, x ≥ 0 is a TDI system. From (3.5) and Lemma 3.3, we thus
deduce that π(G, ≺) is also TDI.
Second proof of Lemma 3.2. Let G = (V, E). To establish the assertion, we need
to show the following:
(1) D(G, ≺, w) has an integral optimal solution for all w ∈ ZE .
To this end, we apply induction on |E|. If |E| = 0, then E = ∅ and thus (1)
is trivial. So we proceed to the induction step and assume that (1) holds for all
preference systems with fewer edges in the corresponding graphs.
If G = H, then (1) follows instantly from Theorem 1.3. So we assume that G = H
and hence E − E(H) = ∅. Let V 1 be the set of all nonisolated vertices of H. Using
Lemma 2.5, we obtain the following:
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(2) G has three distinct vertices r, s, t, such that fG (r) = s ∈ V 1 , lG (s) = t, and
st ∈ E − E(H).
From (2), it can be seen that
(3) e s st for all e ∈ δ(s) and hence ψ(st) = {st} ∪ {e ∈ δ(t) : st ≺t e}.
Let (G , ≺) be the preference system whose preference table is obtained from
T (G, ≺) by deleting the pair {s, t} with G = (V, E  ). Observe that G = G\st and
E  = E − {st}. From (2) and Lemma 2.2(v), we see that
(4) (H, ≺) is also the representation of (G , ≺).
In the remainder of our proof, we use δ  (v) to denote the set of all edges of G
incident with a vertex v and use ϕ (e) (resp., ψ  (e)) to denote the set of all edges of
G dominating (resp., dominated by) an edge e in E  . In view of Lemma 2.3(iii) (with
(G , ≺) in place of (G, ≺)), we have F SM (G , ≺) = ∅. (Actually this result was ﬁrst
established for all preference systems by Abeledo and Rothblum [1] using a diﬀerent
method.) Motivated by Lemma 2.4(ii), we propose to show the following:
(5) Let x̄ be a vector in F SM (G , ≺) and let x be obtained from x̄ by adding one
more entry x(st) = 0. Then x ∈ F SM (G, ≺).
To justify this, note that
• x(δ(v)) = x̄(δ  (v)) ≤ 1 for all v ∈ V and
• x(ϕ(e)) = x̄(ϕ (e)) ≥ 1 for all e ∈ E  .
For the edge st, by (3) we have e ≺s st for all e ∈ δ  (s), which implies that x(ϕ(st)) ≥
x̄(δ  (s)). Since s ∈ V 1 , by (4) and Lemma 2.4(i) (with G in place of G), we obtain
x̄(δ  (s)) = 1. So x(ϕ(st)) ≥ 1. Combining the above observations, we conclude that
x satisﬁes (1.2)−(1.4) simultaneously, so (5) holds.
By (4) and induction hypothesis on (G , ≺), the linear system π(G , ≺) is totally
dual integral. Thus the deﬁnition of TDI system guarantees the existence of an integral
optimal solution (ȳ, z̄) to D(G , ≺, w̄), where w̄ = w|E  . Let x̄ be an optimal solution
to P(G , ≺, w̄). It follows from the LP duality theorem that
(6) ȳ(V ) − z̄(E  ) = w̄T x̄.
Let x∗ be the vector obtained from x̄ by adding one more entry x∗ (st) = 0. From
(5), we see that
(7) x∗ is a feasible solution to P(G, ≺, w).
Set = max{0, w(st) − ȳ(s) − ȳ(t) + z̄(ψ(st) − {st})}. Let y ∗ be the vector
obtained from ȳ by replacing ȳ(s) with ȳ(s) + , and let z ∗ be the vector obtained
from z̄ by replacing z̄(rs) with z̄(rs) + and then adding one more entry z ∗ (st) = 0.
By (6), we have y ∗ (V ) − z ∗ (E) = ȳ(V ) + − (z̄(E  ) + ) = w̄T x̄. Hence
(8) y ∗ (V ) − z ∗ (E) = wT x∗ .
We propose to show that
(9) y ∗ (u) + y ∗ (v) − z ∗ (ψ(uv)) ≥ w(uv) for all uv ∈ E.
To justify this, we distinguish among ﬁve cases.
Case 1. {u, v} ∩ {r, s, t} = ∅. In this case, y ∗ (u) + y ∗ (v) − z ∗ (ψ(uv)) = ȳ(u) +
ȳ(v) − z̄(ψ  (uv)) ≥ w(uv) because (ȳ, z̄) is a feasible solution to D(G , ≺, w̄).
Case 2. u = s and v = t. In this case, y ∗ (s) + y ∗ (t) − z ∗ (ψ(st)) = (ȳ(s) + ) +
ȳ(t) − z ∗ (st) − z ∗ (ψ(st) − {st}) = ȳ(s) + + ȳ(t) − z̄(ψ(st) − {st}) ≥ w(st) by the
deﬁnition of .
Case 3. u = s and v = t. In this case, z ∗ (ψ(sv)) = z̄(ψ  (sv) − {sr}) + z ∗ (sr) ·
|{sr}∩ψ  (sv)|+z ∗ (st) = z̄(ψ  (sv)−{sr})+(z̄(sr)+ )·|{sr}∩ψ  (sv)| ≤ z̄(ψ  (sv))+ . So
y ∗ (s)+y ∗ (v)−z ∗ (ψ(sv)) ≥ (ȳ(s)+ )+ ȳ(v)−(z̄(ψ  (sv))+ ) = ȳ(s)+ ȳ(v)− z̄(ψ  (sv)) ≥
w(sv).
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Case 4. u = s and v = t. In this case, ψ(ut) ⊆ ψ  (ut) ∪ {st} and y ∗ (u) + y ∗ (t) −
z (ψ(ut)) ≥ ȳ(u) + ȳ(t) − (z̄(ψ  (ut)) + z ∗ (st)) = ȳ(u) + ȳ(t) − z̄(ψ  (ut)) ≥ w(ut).
Case 5. u = r and v = s. In this case, we have rs ∈ ψ(rv) = ψ  (rv) for
s = fG (r), which implies that z ∗ (ψ(rv)) = z̄(ψ  (rv)). So y ∗ (r) + y ∗ (v) − z ∗ (ψ(rv)) =
ȳ(r) + ȳ(v) − z̄(ψ  (rv)) ≥ w(rv).
As these cases have exhausted all possibilities, (9) is established.
From (9), it follows that
(10) (y ∗ , z ∗ ) is an integral feasible solution to D(G, ≺, w).
Combining (7), (8), and (10) and using the LP duality theorem, we can further
conclude that (y ∗ , z ∗ ) is an integral optimal solution to D(G, ≺, w). This proves (1)
and hence Lemma 3.2.
As described in Gusﬁeld and Irving [6] and Király and Pap [8], network ﬂow
techniques can be used to solve various stable matching problems and their duals.
The following lemma is concerned with their algorithm for ﬁnding a maximum-weight
stable matching and a minimum-cost stable cover of a bipartite preference system.
Since the algorithm is lengthy, we shall neither get into the details nor discuss its
correctness. What we are going to do is to outline its major steps and ﬁgure out its
complexity, which is not given explicitly in [6] or [8].
Lemma 3.4 (see [6, 8]). Let (G, ≺) be a bipartite preference system with G =
(V, E). Then for any w ∈ ZE , a maximum-weight stable matching and a minimumcost stable cover of (G, ≺, w) can be found in O(m2 log m) time, where m = |E|.
Proof. To establish this complexity result, let us give a sketch of their algorithm.
In the initialization step, we construct the following objects (see [8] for undeﬁned
terms):
(i) the set R of all rotations of (G, ≺), such that each ρ ∈ R is expressed
in the form ρ = (v1 , u1 , v2 , u2 , . . . , vk , uk ) for which w∗ (ρ) is deﬁned to be
k
i=1 (−w(vi ui ) + w(ui vi+1 )) with vk+1 = v1 ;
(ii) the rotation digraph D = (R, A) whose closed subsets (i.e., vertex subsets
with no incoming arcs from the outside) correspond to stable matchings of
(G, ≺); and
(iii) the so-called man-optimal stable matching M0 of (G, ≺).
Since both |R| and |A| are linear in m (see [8] and proof of Lemma 3.3.2 in [6]), as
discussed in subsection 3.3.1 and section 3.6 of [6], this step can be carried out in
O(nm) time, where n = |V |.
Let opt denote the optimal objective value of the problem

Downloaded 05/12/14 to 147.8.204.164. Redistribution subject to SIAM license or copyright; see http://www.siam.org/journals/ojsa.php

∗

Maximize

(w∗ )T β

subject to

β(ρ) − β(ρ ) ≥ 0
1 ≥ β(ρ) ≥ 0

∀ (ρ, ρ ) ∈ A,
∀ρ∈R

(see (i) for the deﬁnition of w∗ ) and its dual

(3.7)

Minimize

γ(R)

subject to

γ(ρ) − γ(A+(ρ)) + γ(A−(ρ)) ≥ w∗ (ρ)

∀ ρ ∈ R, γ ∈ RR∪A
,
+

where A+ (ρ) and A− (ρ) are the sets of arcs in D leaving ρ and entering ρ, respectively.
In the main step of the algorithm, our objective is to ﬁnd a closed subset S of R with
w∗ (S) = opt and an integral optimal solution γ ∗ to problem (3.7). As elaborated in
the proofs of Theorem 3.6.2 and Lemma 3.6.3 in [6], the desired S can be obtained
from a minimum cut in an auxiliary ﬂow network D (constructed from D by adding

Copyright © by SIAM. Unauthorized reproduction of this article is prohibited.

Downloaded 05/12/14 to 147.8.204.164. Redistribution subject to SIAM license or copyright; see http://www.siam.org/journals/ojsa.php

1358

XUJIN CHEN, GUOLI DING, XIAODONG HU, AND WENAN ZANG

a source and a sink). It is not diﬃcult to see that an integral maximum ﬂow in D
also yields the desired γ ∗ . So this step can be carried out in O(m2 log m) time using
the Goldberg–Tarjan algorithm [5, 13].
Given such an S, we can ﬁnally obtain a stable matching of (G, ≺, w) with maximum possible weight w(M0 ) + opt from M0 by eliminating all rotations in S in O(nm)
time. (See [8] or subsections 3.6.1 and 3.6.2 of [6] for details.) Besides, starting from
γ ∗ , as shown by Király and Pap [8], it takes O(nm) time to ﬁnd a minimum-cost
stable cover of (G, ≺, w).
Therefore, a maximum-weight stable matching and a minimum-cost stable cover
of (G, ≺, w) can be found in O(m2 log m) time.
Now let us present an eﬃcient combinatorial algorithm for ﬁnding a maximumweight stable matching and a minimum-cost stable cover in a more general setting,
where δi (t) is the set of all edges in Gi incident with the vertex t.
Algorithm 1 for the maximum-weight stable matching problem and its dual.
Input: A preference system (G, ≺) with a bipartite representation (H, ≺) and a
weight function w ∈ ZE .
Output: A maximum-weight stable matching M and a minimum-cost stable cover
(y, z) of (G, ≺, w).
1. M ← a maximum-weight stable matching of (H, ≺, w|E(H) ),
(y, z) ← an integral optimal solution to D(H, ≺, w|E(H) ) (see Lemma 3.4),
V 1 ← the set of all nonisolated vertices in H, G0 ← G, i ← 0
2. while E(Gi ) − E(H) = ∅ do
3. Find three distinct vertices ri , si , ti ∈ V (Gi ) such that fGi (ri ) = si ∈ V 1 ,
lGi (si ) = ti , and si ti ∈ E(Gi ) − E(H)
4. Gi+1 ← Gi \si ti , i ← i + 1
5. end while
6. forj = i − 1 down to 0 do
7. r ← rj , s ← sj , t ← tj , ← max{0, w(st) − y(s) − y(t) + z({e ∈ δj+1 (t) :
st ≺t e})}, y(s) ← y(s) + , z(rs) ← z(rs) + , z(st) ← 0
8. endfor
9. Output M and (y, z)
Lemma 3.5. Let (G, ≺) be a preference system with a bipartite representation
(H, ≺) and with G = (V, E). Then for any w ∈ ZE , Algorithm 1 correctly finds a
maximum-weight stable matching and a minimum-cost stable cover of (G, ≺, w) in
O(m2 log m) time, where m = |E|.
Proof. By Lemma 3.4, the stable matching M speciﬁed in line 1 can be found
in O(m2 log m) time. From Lemma 2.2(i), we conclude that M is a maximum-weight
stable matching of (G, ≺, w) as well.
Set k = |E − E(H)|. Then Gk = H and Gj is obtained from Gj+1 by adding
the edge sj tj for j = k − 1, k − 2, . . . , 0. Let (yj , zj ) be the (y, z) generated in the
algorithm corresponding to Gj for j = k, k − 1, . . . , 0. By line 1, (yk , zk ) is an integral
optimal solution to D(Gk , ≺, w). Thus, from the proof of Lemma 3.2 (with Gj in
place of G and Gj+1 in place of G ), we deduce that (yj , zj ) is an integral optimal
solution to D(Gj , ≺, w|E(Gj ) ) for j = k − 1, k − 2, . . . , 0. So the (y, z) output by the
algorithm is an integral optimal solution to D(G, ≺, w).
It is easy to see that the complexity of the algorithm is dominated by line 1.
Hence the whole algorithm runs in O(m2 log m) time.
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Now we are ready to establish the main result of this paper.
Proof of Theorem 1.5. From the Edmonds–Giles theorem stated in section 1, we
see that (iv)⇒(iii). The implications (iii)⇒(ii), (ii)⇒(i), and (i)⇒(iv) are established
by Lemma 3.1, Lemma 2.3(iv), and Lemma 3.2, respectively. So the statements
(i)–(iv) are equivalent. The second half of our theorem follows from Lemma 3.5.
By Lemma 3.1, if (G, ≺) ∈
/ , then F SM (G, ≺)− SM (G, ≺) = ∅. Using Theorem
1.5, we can explicitly ﬁnd an element of this set.
Corollary 3.6. Let (G, ≺) be a preference system outside , let (H, ≺) be its
representation, and let C be the semistable partition as defined in Lemma 2.3(iii).
Then (recall (1.9))
xC ∈ F SM (G, ≺) − SM (G, ≺).
Proof. From the proof of Lemma 3.1, we see that if xC ∈ SM (G, ≺), then GC is
a bipartite graph and hence so is H by Lemma 2.3(iv). It follows from Theorem 1.5
that (G, ≺) ∈ ; this contradiction establishes the assertion.
We ﬁnally arrive to statements concerning general preference systems.
Proof of Theorem 1.7. To establish the assertion, let us ﬁrst show that
(1) for any w ∈ ZE , the problem D(G, ≺, w) has a half-integral optimal solution
(ȳ, z̄), which can be found in O(m2 log m) time.
For this purpose, we construct a bipartite preference system (G , ≺ ) with G =


(V , E  ), and deﬁne a weight function w ∈ ZE as follows:
• Each vertex v ∈ V corresponds to two vertices v̄, v̂ ∈ V  .
• Each edge uv ∈ E corresponds to two edges ūv̂, ûv̄ ∈ E  with weight w (ūv̂) =
w (ûv̄) = w(uv).
• Each pair of adjacent edges vp, vq ∈ E with vp ≺v vq in (G, ≺) corresponds
to two pairs of adjacent edges v̄ p̂, v̄ q̂ ∈ E  and v̂ p̄, v̂ q̄ ∈ E  with v̄ p̂ ≺v̄ v̄ q̂ and
v̂ p̄ ≺v̂ v̂ q̄ in (G , ≺ ).
This completes the construction of (G , ≺ ) and deﬁnition of w . We point out that
this proof technique was ﬁrst introduced by Abeledo and Rothblum in their proof of
Theorem 3.3 in [1].
Let (y∗ , z∗ ) be an optimal solution to D(G, ≺, w). Set y  (v̄) = y  (v̂) = y∗ (v)
for all v ∈ V , and set z  (ūv̂) = z  (ûv̄) = z∗ (uv) for all uv ∈ E. It is a routine
matter to check that (y  , z  ) is a feasible solution to D(G , ≺ , w ) with objective value
y  (V  ) − z  (E  ) = 2(y∗ (V ) − z∗ (E)). So
(2) the optimal objective value of D(G , ≺ , w ) is at most 2(y∗ (V ) − z∗ (E)).
Since G is a bipartite graph with |E  | = 2m, by Theorem 1.3 we can ﬁnd an
integral optimal solution (y∗ , z∗ ) to D(G , ≺ , w ) in O(m2 log m) time. Using (2), we
obtain
(3) y∗ (V  ) − z∗ (E  ) ≤ 2(y∗ (V ) − z∗ (E)).
Set ȳ(v) = (y∗ (v̄) + y∗ (v̂))/2 for all v ∈ V , and set z̄(uv) = (z∗ (ūv̂) + z∗ (ûv̄))/2
for all uv ∈ E. It is easy to see that (ȳ, z̄) is a feasible solution to D(G, ≺, w) with
objective value
(4) ȳ(V ) − z̄(E) = (y∗ (V  ) − z∗ (E  ))/2 ≤ y∗ (V ) − z∗ (E) by (3).
From the optimality of (y∗ , z∗ ), we deduce that (ȳ, z̄) is also an optimal solution to
D(G, ≺, w). Clearly, (ȳ, z̄) is half-integral and can be generated in O(m2 log m) time.
Thus (1) holds, which implies that π(G, ≺) is totally dual half-integral.
By Lemma 3.4, an integral optimal solution x∗ to P(G , ≺ , w ) can be found in
O(m2 log m) time. Observe that
(5) (w )T x∗ = y∗ (V  ) − z∗ (E  ).
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Set x̄(uv) = (x∗ (ūv̂) + x∗ (ûv̄))/2 for all uv ∈ E. It is straightforward to verify
that x̄ is a feasible solution to P(G, ≺, w) with objective value wT x̄ = (w )T x∗ /2 =
ȳ(V ) − z̄(E) by (5) and (4). So, from the LP duality theorem, we can conclude that
x̄ is an optimal solution to P(G, ≺, w). Clearly, x̄ is half-integral and can be obtained
in O(m2 log m) time.
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